Introduction
New York Times columnist Paul Krugman declared that for backers of Wisconsin's Act 10 the goal "is to make Wisconsin -and eventually, America -less of a functioning democracy and more of a third-world-style oligarchy." 1 Krugman was more theatrical than most in denouncing the set of Wisconsin public sector reforms enacted on March 11, 2011.
The spirit of Krugman's condemnation, however, has been echoed by a broad coalition of labor activists, students, left-leaning political commentators, and Democratic politicians.
Words such as radical, extreme, and even un-American have been used to describe Act 10.
The law itself has two major components. First, it requires public-sector workers to make larger contributions to their pension and health benefits, effectively reducing their compensation. Second, Act 10 limits the power of public-sector unions by restricting collective bargaining for most workers and making dues collection more difficult.
How objectionable are these changes? Are they really unfair to public workers? One of the best ways to answer this question is to compare public-sector compensation with private-sector compensation. Politics and ideology aside, almost everyone agrees that public workers should be paid at fair market rates-neither more nor less than comparable private workers.
If public employees in Wisconsin were already paid less than comparably-skilled private workers in the state, then Act 10 would only exacerbate an unacceptable situation.
Alternatively, if public workers were enjoying a compensation premium over their privatesector counterparts, then Act 10 could be considered a valuable reform.
In this study, we compare the wages and benefits for government employees in Wisconsin to those of comparable private-sector workers. We find that, even following significant increases to pension and health insurance contributions mandated by Act 10, total public sector compensation in Wisconsin remains comfortably ahead of compensation for private sector workers with similar levels of education and experience. Specifically:
• After Act 10, Wisconsin state workers receive health benefits nearly twice as valuable and pension benefits more than 4.5 times as valuable as what workers in large private firms receive.
• Before Act 10, Wisconsin state employees received total compensation (salary and benefits) about 29 percent higher than comparable private sector workers. After Act 10, the compensation premium is about 22 percent.
• In dollar terms, the average Wisconsin state worker after Act 10 receives total compensation including benefits equal to $81,637 versus $67,068 for a similarly-skilled private worker, a difference of $14,569.
The implication is that Act 10 is far from a radical or sweeping reform. Its direct reductions to public sector compensation still preserve a substantial premium for public workers, and its limitations on the political power of unions could reflect a reasonable desire to restrict the growth of compensation in the future. Act 10's reforms fail to restore pay parity between the public and private sectors in Wisconsin.
The remainder of this report details our methodology for comparing compensation in each sector, starting with wages and moving on to the fringe benefits targeted by Act 10.
Wages
The general intuition about public-sector compensation is that wages are lower than private sector levels while benefits are more generous. For that reason, we cannot determine the generosity of public-sector compensation merely by comparing benefits between sectors. We need to consider total compensation, starting with wages.
To compare the wages of different groups of workers, labor economists utilize the "human capital model." The human capital approach relies upon empirical evidence that wages are driven largely by worker productivity, measured in most studies by education and experience. Since public workers in Wisconsin differ from private workers in terms of skills and other characteristics, we must control for those differences before comparing average wages. The standard approach uses linear regression, in which the natural logarithm of wages or salaries is regressed on a set of worker characteristics, including an indicator (or "dummy") variable for whether an individual is a government worker. The value of this dummy variable tells us the difference in wages between the two sectors after accounting for the control variables. That difference is the unexplained wage penalty or premium associated with government work.
Below we present several different wage analyses to give readers a sense of the data and results, but we can preview the conclusion now: Overall, wages appear to be roughly equal between comparably-skilled public and private workers in Wisconsin. Some specifications will show a small wage penalty for public workers, and others will show a small wage premium. We are not wedded to a precise estimate, but there is no evidence that a large wage penalty or wage premium is skewing overall compensation.
We limit our analysis to full-time civilian workers ages 18 to 64 who earned a wage or salary during the whole previous calendar year. 2 Source: Author's calculations using various datasets.
private-sector workers in the state. But using the ACS with standard controls as well as PUMAs and degree fields indicates that public workers receive 5.6 percent more. While the results vary from a small penalty to a small premium depending on the specification, there is no evidence for a large difference in either direction.
To supplement the human capital model, we present an alternative approach that, rather than comparing salaries for workers with similar skills, compares salaries for jobs with similar skill requirements. This jobs-to-jobs approach relies upon data from the National Compensation Survey (NCS) conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
Unlike the CPS and ACS, which survey individuals, the NCS is a survey of employers. As part of the survey, BLS economists analyze the job skill requirements of different work positions and assign them a "work level" based upon the federal General Schedule, which ranges from GS-1 to GS-15.
BLS economists have compared public and private sector pay nationwide using these work levels. They found that after controlling for job skill requirements and major occupational categories, state government employees nationwide receive average salaries approximately 3.5 percent below private sector levels, while local government employees receive salaries around 7.2 percent above those of similar private sector workers. 5 The inclusion of benefits increases these pay differences.
The NCS data available to the public are not as detailed as those available to internal government researchers, making calculations of weighted average salaries across employee work levels impossible. However, it is possible to provide basic comparisons of The work-level approach is potentially valuable, since the NCS offers a finer-grained analysis of skill requirements than the human capital model alone can provide. Two caveats are necessary, however. First, it is essential in a survey like this that both groups of jobs-in this case, public and private jobs-are evaluated on exactly the same criteria.
Second, it is possible that jobs with the same skill requirements in each sector could actually be held by people with different levels of skill, perhaps due to different hiring 6 Given the data available, we cannot determine with certainty whether either of these criteria are satisfied.
In summary, there is little evidence of a large disparity in wages between the public and private sectors in Wisconsin after controlling for the skills demanded by public sector jobs or supplied by public sector employees. We can see plausible arguments for a small public wage penalty or a small public wage premium, but neither disparity could be large enough to skew overall comparisons of compensation. Our working assumption, therefore, is a wage difference of zero between sectors. This makes calculations simple and helps to focus attention on the same part of compensation targeted by Act 10--the benefits.
Comparing Benefits: The Data Challenges
Fringe benefits include paid time off, health insurance, health coverage, pensions, taxes paid on workers' behalf -such as for Social Security and
Medicare -and other forms of non-cash compensation. Table 2 summarizes the main types of fringe benefits as categorized by the BLS.
Our principal source of data on benefits is the Employer Costs for Employee Compensation (ECEC) dataset published by the BLS as part of the NCS. The ECEC is a survey of employers regarding the contributions they make on employees' behalf toward a variety of fringe benefits, shown in Table   2 . The ECEC has occasionally been billed as a comprehensive source of information on benefits, but it has a number of drawbacks, especially for state-level analyses. First, the ECEC data are not actually comprehensive. The dataset entirely excludes retiree healthcare costs, for example, and its pension cost estimates are based only on what governments decide to put into their pension funds, which can differ significantly from the value of the future benefits that employees have been promised. Second, ECEC data are not available on a state-by-state basis. The smallest area it covers is a Census "division," which in this case merges Wisconsin with the surrounding states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. For private sector employees this is not a significant problem, since private sector trends are driven by the market and tend to cross state lines. However, one of the issues motivating Act 10 was the argument that Wisconsin public employees received more generous pension and health benefits than government workers in adjoining states.
In the following sections we use ECEC data for the private-sector comparison group and for the smaller, less important benefit categories in the public-sector. The major benefit data for public workers, however, will come from various actuarial reports, government disclosures, and academic studies specific to Wisconsin.
Our baseline estimates are focused on Wisconsin state government employees. The large number of local governments make comprehensive estimates of local government benefits difficult. However, we supplement the discussion with reference to benefits paid in major localities such as Milwaukee.
The last issue is the choice of a private-sector control group. As an establishment survey based around employers, the ECEC data do not contain detailed individual-level skill controls similar to those in the CPS and ACS wage data. Fortunately, benefit generosity is more a function of firm size than worker skill. Companies tend to offer the same benefit packages to most of their employees, but larger companies offer the more generous packages.
Since the Wisconsin state government is a "large firm," we compare public sector benefits to those paid to individuals employed in private sector establishments of 100 or more employees, which BLS data indicates includes around 43 percent of the workforce.
"Establishment size" refers to the number of employees at one work site, whereas "firm size" is the total number of employees working at a firm regardless of location. Comparing to benefits paid at establishments of 100 or greater produces a similar match to the firm size controls used in the CPS salary regressions, where the largest firm size is categorized as 1,000 or more.
For context, Table 3 illustrates the value of total hourly benefits by private sector establishment size, relatively to the overall average among all workers. For instance, establishments of 1 to 99 workers pay total benefits equal to 70 percent of the overall average, while establishments of 500 or more workers pay benefits equal to 159 percent of the average. Our chosen category of private sector establishments with 100 or more workers pays benefits 31 percent larger than the overall average. Roughly 44 percent of Wisconsin private sector employees are employed in establishments of 100 or greater, with the remainder in smaller establishments that on average provide less generous benefits. 7 Thus, we are comparing Wisconsin public sector workers to a sub-group of private sector employees who receive relatively generous fringe benefits. 
Pensions
Comparing the value of pension benefits can be challenging because public-and private-sector employees generally participate in different types of pension plans. Most private-sector employees participate in "defined contribution" (DC) 401(k)-type pension plans. In a DC plan, the employer may provide a matching contribution to the pension account but guarantees no specific benefit in retirement. All risk is borne by the worker.
Most public employees, by contrast, have traditional defined benefit (DB) pensions that provide a guaranteed monthly benefit at retirement. 8 An important point should be clarified from the outset. The value today of an employee benefit that will be paid in the future -such as pensions or retiree health benefits -depends on how generous the benefit is and how likely it is to be paid. The value of benefits to employees does not depend upon whether those benefits are pre-funded (as DB pensions are) or are paid on a pay-as-you-go basis (as are retiree health benefits).
Moreover, for benefits that are pre-funded, their value does not depend upon the employer's funding strategy -that is, whether the pension plan makes higher contributions invested in safer assets (as does WRS) or invests in riskier assets and makes lower contributions (as does the Milwaukee Employee Retirement System). The degree of prefunding, and whether those funds are invested in safe or risky assets, determines how cost burdens are distributed between current and future taxpayers. It does not determine the value of benefits to employees themselves.
Public sector employees with DB pensions receive benefits that are, on average, both more generous and less risky than those paid by private sector DC pensions. Our approach accounts for differences in both generosity and risk.
Based on the ECEC, the average employer contribution toward DC pensions in the private sector is 3.1 percent of salaries. This employer contribution can be treated as equivalent to a 3.1 percent increase in private sector wages.
The Wisconsin Retirement System (WRS) administers a DB plan that covers about 90 percent of the state's government employees. In the WRS, retirement benefits are equal to around 1.7 percent of final salary multiplied by the number of years of service. 9 To fund these benefits, the Wisconsin state government now contributes an amount equal to 5.8 percent of workers' wages, matched by a 5.8 percent contribution from state employees. As we will see, however, simple comparisons of employer contribution rates can be highly misleading.
To illustrate the relative generosity of public and private sector pension benefits, we calculate annual retirement benefit levels under the WRS and a stylized 401(k) pension plan for an individual who retires at age 65 with final earnings of $56,700. 10 To generate an equal guaranteed pension benefit, a private sector worker with a 401(k) plan would need to amass roughly $839,000 at retirement. 11 For our simulations, a career-long salary history is generated using WRS assumptions regarding the growth of individual wages from year to year. We estimate the WRS benefits payable to such a retiree assuming working careers in 5-year increments from a high of 40 years to a low of 10 years.
Using the same salary history, we model the annual benefits that would be payable from a 401(k) plan assuming an employee contribution of 5.8 percent of wages -to match public employee contributions to the WRS -and an employer contribution of 3.1 percent of pay, based upon ECEC data.
In calculating the benefits payable from the 401(k), we must assume a rate of investment return on account contributions. It might be tempting to assume a mix of stocks and bonds--what most workers with 401(k) plans choose--and then utilize an assumed future return on such a portfolio. That choice would be wrong, however, because it would produce a retirement benefit with far greater risk than WRS's defined benefits, which are guaranteed by law and legal precedents. 12
The Congressional Budget Office and White House Office of Management and Budget address this problem by "risk adjusting" investment returns. 13 sector pay in Wisconsin.
While helpful, these stylized calculations have their limits. Public employees have different career lengths and salaries and tend to retire when it is most financially advantageous to do so. 18 Moreover, in addition to retirement benefits the WRS also provides disability and survivor benefits, which the simple calculations shown in Figure 1 cannot represent. To capture these aspects of the WRS we turn to an actuarial measure called the "normal cost" of the program. The normal cost refers to the contributions plans make today -at an assumed 7.2 percent investment return -to fund benefits accruing to workers in a given year. 19 The normal cost for WRS in 2011 was 11.6 percent of wages, with 5.8 percent each paid by employees and the government. 20 However, the normal cost calculated using a risky rate of return reflects only the contribution rate at which the WRS could "expect" to be able to pay benefits. It does not reflect the fact that WRS benefits are guaranteed and must be paid regardless of how the plan's investments fare. As the federal Bureau of Economic Analysis notes,
If the assets of a defined-benefit plan are insufficient to pay promised benefits, the plan sponsor must cover the shortfall. This obligation represents an additional source of pension wealth for participants in an underfunded plan. 21 For the reasons we outline, the BEA states that, "Contributions aren't always a good approximation for the value of benefits accrued through service."
To capture the full value of DB pensions to Wisconsin employees, we recalculate the normal cost using a risk-adjusted interest rate. The normal cost of WRS pensions when discounted at a 3.67 percent interest rate rises from 11.6 percent of wages to 29.5 percent of wages. 22 Prior to Act 10, most state employees contributed only 0. However, many private sector DB plans have also been closed, meaning that the plans continue to pay benefits without workers accruing new benefits. Part of the employer payment reported in the ECEC is therefore not compensation for current employees.
According to the PBGC, only around half of current private employer DB pension contributions go toward funding the normal costs of the plans, with the remainder financing benefits earned in the past. 28 To account for this, we halve the 3.9 percent employer contribution rate, for an adjusted value of 1.45 percent of salaries.
With regard to DC pensions in the public sector, ECEC data report that, for all states in the East North Central Census Division, average public employer contributions toward DC pension plans equal 1 percent of salaries. However, this is likely driven by Michigan, which has a DC plan for public employees. We are not aware of any significant DC plan benefits for Wisconsin public employees, so we change that value to zero.
We make one final adjustment to retirement benefits. ECEC data report a 4.7 percent contribution to Social Security by public employers in the East North Central
Division. This number is biased downward by states such as Illinois and Ohio, where public workers generally do not participate in Social Security. In contrast, 99 percent of activelyemployed WRS participants are also in Social Security. 29 To correct for this, we change 4.7 percent to (0.99)(6.2) = 6.1 percent.
Employee Health Coverage
Prior For private sector employees we rely upon the ECEC data for the East North Central
Census Division. For private sector workers in establishments of 100 or more employees, employer health contributions are on average equal to 14.2 percent of employee wages.
Overall, these results imply that health coverage for Wisconsin state government employees is nearly twice as generous as that received by private sector employees, even following the contribution increase implemented through Act 10.
Retiree Health Coverage
Most full-time public sector employees are eligible for retiree health insurance, which covers health costs from the time workers retire until they become eligible for Retiree health coverage is less common in the private sector and is generally less valuable where it is available. According to NCS data, nationwide 25 percent of employees categorized as "management, professional, and related" have access to retiree health coverage. 32 Alternately, 28 percent of employees in establishments of 100 or more workers have access to retiree health coverage. However, a Kaiser Family Foundation survey reports that 29 percent of companies that report offering retiree health coverage do not offer it to newly hired workers. 33 Little data is available on the value of retiree health coverage, making overall estimates difficult to generate. For these purposes, we will assume that the value of retiree health coverage for private sector employees who have access to it is similar to that of Wisconsin state government employees, for whom such coverage is worth approximately 2.4 percent of pay. We assume that 28 percent of comparable private sector workers have access to such coverage, for an average value of 0.7 percent of wages. We acknowledge that these figures for retiree health are not nearly as precise as our estimates for pensions and regular health coverage. At the same time, the value of retiree health benefits in the private sector is not plausibly large. 
Total Benefits

Putting It All Together
Since salaries are approximately equal between Wisconsin public and private sector employees with similar levels of education and experience, more generous benefits create a Prior to the passage of Act 10, which increased employee contributions for pensions and health coverage, the public sector premium was significantly greater. Moving the 5. 
The Local Picture
As noted, the pension and health benefits listed in Table 4 apply primarily to state workers, not employees of local governments. Benefits vary considerably for local government workers throughout the state, but we can explore benefit levels in some of the larger municipalities.
Among the major benefit categories, pension benefits vary the least between state and local government workers. Most of the public workforce at both the state and local level is enrolled in the WRS. The major exception is the Milwaukee area. Workers participating in the Milwaukee Employees' Retirement System (ERS) receive a substantially better deal than WRS participants. The risk-adjusted normal cost of the ERS plan for general-category (meaning non-public safety) workers is 47 percent of wages, with an employee contribution of about 6 percent.
Unlike WRS, a substantial percentage of ERS participants are public safety workers, whose pension benefits are even more generous. If both general-category and public safety workers are considered together, the risk-adjusted normal cost of ERS becomes an aweinspiring 65 percent of wages. 35 Health insurance for local government employees is more varied than pension benefits. A survey of Wisconsin school districts found that in the 2010-2011 school year, teachers and other school staff on average paid only 4 percent of the premium cost for single health coverage and 5 percent of the cost for family coverage. 36 In just six of 276 districts did employees pay more than 12 percent of premiums for single coverage, and in only 12 cases did they pay more than 12 percent of family coverage premiums.
For non-teaching local government employees, data are more scarce. However, the media fact-checker Politifact gathered data on four Wisconsin cities. In Madison, most fulltime employees pay nothing toward their health coverage. In LaCrosse, most employees pay 3.1 percent of premium costs, while Milwaukee city workers pay 3 percent to 8 percent of premiums. In Wassau, employees pay 10 percent of premiums, although they have no copays except for emergency room visits. 37 As noted above, retiree health benefits are modest at the state level, but certain localities have been very generous. In Kenosha County, for instance, retiree health coverage is on average worth 8.5 percent of salaries. 38 In Milwaukee County, the value of accruing retiree health coverage is equal to 12.7 percent of salaries. 39 Milwaukee public schools offer even more generous retiree health coverage, with a value equal to 17.4 percent of wages. 40 In other words, typical Milwaukee teachers would be roughly indifferent between their retiree health benefits and a 17.4 percent salary increase throughout their careers. Relative to salaries, Milwaukee school teachers may receive the most generous retiree health coverage of any non-public safety employees in the country. In sharp contrast, Madison schools provide retiree health benefits equal to just 0.5 percent of wages. 41 In summary, some of the larger municipalities -Milwaukee in particular -appear to offer benefits that substantially outstrip the benefits provided to direct employees of the state of Wisconsin. Including the benefits for local workers would almost certainly increase the public-sector compensation premium that we calculated in the previous section.
However, we emphasize again that individual localities differ significantly, and pay comparisons specific to a particular locality should always use local data.
Compensating Differentials: Job Security
It is well-understood that public sector employment is more secure than private sector jobs. It is more difficult to fire public employees for cause, and layoffs are smaller and less frequent in the public sector. This does not mean that government employees have guaranteed jobs for life. 
Conclusion: Act 10 Had Only a Modest Impact on the Public Sector Pay Premium
Is Act 10, the set of public-sector reforms signed enacted in 2011 amidst nationwide political controversy, a radical piece of legislation? Is it fundamentally unfair to public-sector workers in Wisconsin as its opponents allege? One way to answer that question is to evaluate the total wages and benefits received by public sector workers in the state. If compensation is below market levels, Act 10 would only increase the unfair burden currently falling on public workers, making it more difficult for the government to attract and retain the workers it needs. But if compensation is above market levels, Act 10 could be a reasonable fiscal measure, particularly when facing a budget deficit.
We find that Wisconsin state workers received total compensation about 29 percent greater than comparable private workers before Act 10 was passed. The increased employee health and pension contribution mandated by Act 10 have reduced that premium, but it is still around 22 percent. In addition, public workers in large municipalities such as Milwaukee continue to receive an even better compensation package than what state workers enjoy.
It is difficult to view Act 10 as a radical or sweeping reform. It could be more accurately described as a modest step, one that may actually be inadequate to address the continuing imbalance in Wisconsin between public and private compensation. The ultimate impact of Act 10's restrictions on union political power are difficult to quantify, but these restrictions can be seen as a reasonable attempt to restrain the growth of public-sector compensation going into the future. 15 This is the midpoint of 2011, the year we are focusing on. The current yield is around 2.2 percent, while the Social Security Administration projects that over the next 25 years the yield on Treasury securities (which are held by the Social Security trust fund) will average 5.3 percent. 16 We convert lump sums in DC pensions to an annual benefit stream using prices for an inflationindexed annuity offered by the federal Thrift Savings Plan. This annuity differs from the WRS, where postemployment benefit increases are based not upon inflation but upon investment earnings. Under WRS plan rules, benefits are increased annual so long as the investment income credited to the "retired life funds" exceeds the 5 percent assumed return on the fund, other plan variables are within projected ranges and the benefit increase would be greater than 0.5 percent. Unlike Social Security COLAs, these benefit increases can be reduced if investment income is insufficient, although benefits can never go below the initial level granted at retirement. Over the long term, these post-employment benefit increases have been higher than Social Security COLAs -4.7 percent annually over the past 28 years versus 2.9 percent for Social Security -but less certain. We treat these benefit increases as having approximately the same value as an annuity option offered by the federal Thrift Savings Plan that promises annual benefit increases equal to rise in the Consumer Price Index, with a maximum of 3 percent per year. We use TSP annuity prices as of May 2012 to determine benefit
